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 ABSTRACT: Metaphysical theories heavily rely on the use of primitives to which they 
typically appeal. I will start by examining and evaluating some traditional well-known 
theories and I will discuss the  role of primitives in metaphysical theories in general. 
I will then turn to a discussion of claims of ‘equivalence’ between theories that, I think, 
depend on equivalences of primitives, and I will explore the  nature of primitives. I will 
then claim that almost all explanatory power of metaphysical theories comes from their 
primitives, and so I will turn to scrutinize the notion of ‘power’ and ‘explanatory’. 
 RÉSUMÉ : Il est fréquent que les théories métaphysiques aient recours, et dépendent 
fortement, de l’usage de primitives. Dans cet article, j’examine et j’évalue d’abord 
brièvement certaines théories métaphysiques traditionnelles pour ensuite discuter le 
rôle des primitives dans les théories métaphysiques en général. J’aborde ensuite la 
question de «l’équivalence» entre des théories, qui, je crois, dépend de l’équivalence 
entre leurs primitives, et j’explore la  nature des primitives. Je défends enfi n l’idée selon 
laquelle presque tout le pouvoir explicatif des théories métaphysiques provient de leurs 
primitives, avant d’examiner la notion de «pouvoir» et d’«explication». 
 §1. 
 Among central points of discussion in metaontology are claims of ‘equiva-
lence’ between allegedly competing theories  1  . In this paper, I want to explore 
some general reasons there are for such claims, and see what can be learned 
from them. I believe that  a lot in this metaontological debate, and in metaphys-
ical debates in general, relies heavily on the use and the nature of  primitives to 
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which theories typically appeal. I will start by examining and evaluating some 
clearly  non -equivalent theories and, in §2, I shall discuss the  role of primitives 
in metaphysical theories in general. In §5-6, I will then turn to a discussion of 
claims of equivalence between theories that, I think, depend on equivalences of 
primitives, and I will explore the role and the  nature of primitives in general. 
By doing this, I will emphasize the utmost importance of primitives in the 
construction of metaphysical theories and in the subsequent evaluation of 
them. In §7-8, I will claim that almost all explanatory power of metaphysical 
theories comes from their primitives, and I will then scrutinize the notion 
of “power” and “explanatory”. Together, these points will naturally lead 
me to defend a global view on the nature of the metaphysical enterprise: very 
close to what Jonathan Schaffer  2  suggested, for different reasons, I will claim 
that what is at stake in metaphysics is to fi nd out not just what there is or what 
there is not, but what is more fundamental than what: to fi nd out what are the 
best primitives. 
 §2. 
 Let us start with one of the oldest problems in metaphysics: the problem of 
attribute agreement. A Ferrari and an apple are both the same shade of red, 
they ‘share the same property’, and the metaphysician’s questions are: 
What are properties? What is their nature? How do objects have their prop-
erties? How is it possible for two objects to have the same property? These 
inter-related questions, and especially the third, is ‘the problem of attribute 
agreement.’ 
 A number of theories have been put forward as answers to these questions. 
Here, I shall now briefl y examine three theories that I take to be the most 
representative of the variety of views available. 
 Let us begin with the view  3  that objects like apples and Ferraris are bare 
particulars (substrata) that instantiate spatio-temporal multiply locatable 
(repeatable) universals. An object  a is F if  a instantiates the ‘immanent’ univer-
sal F-ness. Two objects  a and  b are both F (‘share the same property’) if  a 
and  b both instantiate the numerically same universal F-ness. 
 A second possible answer to the problem of attribute agreement is the 
tropes-bundle theory  4  . Under this view, there are no substrata, objects are 
‘just’ bundles of compresent non-repeatable, non-multiply locatable, properties–
tropes. An object  a is F if  a has among its members/constituents/parts an 
F-trope. Two objects  a and  b are both F (‘share the same property’) if  a and  b 
both have among their members/constituents/parts numerically different 
F-tropes that are exactly similar. 
 The third answer takes objects as basic: objects are not analyzed, rather they 
are taken as primitive. This is a Resemblance Nominalism such as the one 
defended by Rodriguez-Pereyra  5  . Under this view,  a is F if  a resembles all the 
Fs, and  a and  b are both F (‘share the same property’) if they are both members 
of the same resemblance class. 
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 Thus, we have three answers to the problem of attribute agreement; these 
I have only sketched, and not really explained, hoping that the reader is famil-
iar with them. Now, I draw attention to the fact that these three answers, as 
different as they are, have something in common: they all answer the question 
in a primitivist way. The relation of exact resemblance between tropes, the 
instantiation of the same universal, or the fact that  a and  b resemble each other 
are all primitives postulated by the theories that use them, and they are 
precisely the tools that give us an answer to the problem of attribute 
agreement. In virtue of what are  a and  b both F (‘share the same property’)? 
 Answer 1 : in virtue of instantiating the same universal. And in virtue of 
what are two instances of F-ness instances of F-ness (the same universal)? 
That’s a primitive.  Answer 2 : in virtue of containing exactly similar tropes. 
And in virtue of what are two exactly similar tropes exactly similar? That’s 
a primitive.  Answer 3 : in virtue of resembling each other (and thus being in 
the same resemblance class). And in virtue of what do two objects resemble 
each other? That’s a primitive. 
 The work is done by the theories’ primitives. And don’t think that I have 
carefully chosen my examples in a way that gives me such a result. Let me, 
quickly and even more sketchily, consider other examples of challenges that 
these theories face. 
 Typically, the universals view has been charged with Bradley-like infi nite 
regress objections. Armstrong’s reply  6  is simply that the primitive ‘relation’ 
of instantiation is non-relational — so, no regress. To anticipate something that 
I will discuss in detail later, Armstrong was right to reply thus.  He is construct-
ing his theory, and he is the one who can tell us what his primitives are, and if 
he wants to postulate that instantiation is non-relational, he has the perfect right 
to do so: his primitives are entirely in his power, they are his theoretical postu-
lates (more on this later). Thus, as with the problem of attribute agreement, the 
problem of infi nite regress is avoided by using (indeed, postulating) a primitive 
machinery. 
 Let us take an objection to the tropes-bundle view: it has been frequently 
argued that this view faces the ‘problem of naturalness’, sometimes also called 
the ‘imperfect community problem’. One way to put the objection is to be 
found in Manley  7  : “Consider the resemblance class of tropes (in the actual 
world) that has as members all and only the pink color tropes, the baby-blue 
color tropes, and the purple color tropes. These all resemble each other to 
a good degree and no non-member resembles each of them to that degree. But 
this is no property class worthy of the name ‘natural’”. But Manley also sees 
the ease with which the theory can escape the problem: it actually does not 
even arise if we use  exact resemblance rather than just resemblance. Exact 
resemblance is what we asked for when raising the objection, and exact 
resemblance is what the theory gives us — in a primitive way (which may not 
satisfy the objector, but again, why wouldn’t the tropes-bundle theorist have 
the right to choose what his primitives are?). 
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 Similar situations arise in the case of Resemblance Nominalism as well: the 
companionship problem creates a diffi culty here as well, and the same sort of 
strategy can be applied to face it; and a threat of a regress, sometimes called 
Russell’s Regress  8  , can also be answered by using the primitive fact that  a and  b 
resemble one another  9  . An interesting objection claims that Resemblance Nomi-
nalism has troubles with causality since causal powers of objects should depend 
on how objects are and not on how they are related to other objects  10  . The reply 
is as interesting as the objection  11  : causal powers  do depend on how objects are, 
while objects are the way they are in virtue of resembling other objects — this 
latter claim is among the primitives of Resemblance Nominalism. 
 What I have done above, in a frustratingly sketchy way, is to illustrate the 
fi rst, and I hope quite obvious, claim I want to make about primitives: they do 
a  big part of the job. Without their primitives, the theories could not even begin 
to work, and could certainly not face their theoretical challenges and objections. 
Let me elaborate a bit on this claim. First, I do not take it to be a surprising, and 
even less shocking, claim — and,  even less, an objection: it’s perfectly all right 
to introduce primitives that do heavy-duty jobs, for otherwise there would be 
little justifi cation to bother with them in the fi rst place! Why would we feel the 
need to postulate the existence of an entity such as a non-relational instantia-
tion tie if it weren’t for some important theoretical job to be done? Primitives 
are acceptable in our theories  precisely because they do an important job. 
Second, this fi rst claim about the importance of primitives in metaphysical 
theories can be generalized to many other cases, indeed, any theory contains 
such crucial primitives. For example, in §5-6 we will see the case of the Bundle 
Theory and the Substratum Theory in more detail, where central roles will be 
played by primitives like “compresence” or “substratum” to account for partic-
ularity of particulars and individuation of objects, their persistence through 
time, and so on. Pick any theory you like and you’ll step on heavily loaded 
primitives without which it could not even start to answer the questions we 
asked and to do the job we want it to do. 
 Thus, such primitives are what I call “problem-solvers”. In short, a problem-
solver is a primitive that is there to solve a problem. Our three theories all an-
swer the question of attribute agreement by using their primitives: the relation 
of exact resemblance between tropes, the instantiation of the same universal, or 
the fact that  a and  b resemble each other. At the same crucial places, all three 
views introduce a primitive with the same function:  primitively answer the 
question (“In virtue of what are  a and  b both F?”). Problem solved. With a 
problem-solver. Problem-solvers are commonplace in metaphysics, and in 
philosophy in general; without them we would not get very far. Primitive 
problem-solvers are the pillars that sustain the structures of our theories. 
 §3. 
 Not only are primitives the pillars of our theories, they also are ‘points of 
contact’  12  between them. Take our three answers to the problem of attribute 
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agreement: they all contain a primitive problem-solver at a crucial place in the 
theory that allows them to answer the question. Their primitives are, of course, 
clearly different, but they all have the same overall function within the theory: 
to explain how  a and  b can share the same property. In a very general sense, all 
three views answer the question  in the same way : that is, in a primitive way. 
The meta-metaphysician might then raise her eyebrows — what difference does 
it really make,  with respect to the problem of attribute agreement , to pick one 
theory rather than another? 
 Actually, many meta-metaphysicians do raise their eyebrows, in the case of 
other theories, and for different reasons not necessarily related to the theories’ 
primitives. For instance, Eli Hirsch  13  argues for an ‘equivalence’ claim 
between endurantism and perdurantism, claiming that these debates are merely 
verbal disputes that seem to say different things but that are, in fact, making the 
same claims only formulated in different ways, or, as he puts it, in different 
languages. Bennett  14  focuses on the debate about composition and argues that 
there is little or no reason at all to go for one side of the debate rather than the 
other, even if they are not just terminological variants — it is epistemically 
under-determined which one we should choose. In another article  15  , I argued 
for an equivalence claim between (several versions of) the Bundle Theory and 
the Substratum Theory, and I shall use this case again below to illustrate my 
discussion of primitives. 
 The question is, if at the end of the day competing theories answer our ques-
tions and face their theoretical challenges mainly by using their primitives, 
what difference does it make to pick one theory over the others? Or, even more 
strongly,  is there any difference between the theories at all? Are these theories 
then, in some sense, equivalent? And in what sense could that be? Are they 
metaphysically equivalent? Theoretically equivalent? Terminological variants? 
Epistemically indistinguishable but metaphysically different alternatives? 
I believe that to properly answer these meta-metaphysicians’ questions, we 
need to say more about the  nature of primitives. Thus, in the following section, 
I will distinguish two views about the role and the nature of primitives in meta-
physical theories: a Functional View and a Content View. 
 §4. 
 The notion of a ‘problem-solver’, as I used it above, takes most seriously 
the  functional role primitives play in theories. The idea here is that, primi-
tives being primitive, we are not told much about their nature and thus they are, 
to paraphrase John Locke, “we-know-not-what”, but: “we-do-know-what-
they- do ”. Typically, primitives are introduced in a theory by a metaphysician 
who needs them to perform an important theoretical job, and thus, while intro-
ducing them, she describes what they are by saying what they do — for 
instance, when introducing primitive instantiation, Armstrong described it as a 
tie that has the capacity to relate universals with substrata in a non-relational 
way. We learn from this almost nothing about the  nature of instantiation, but 
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we learn very well its  function . There would be little justifi cation for having 
such a primitive in a theory if it didn’t do some important theoretical job — after 
all, that’s why it is postulated by the theory in the fi rst place — and so what 
really counts it what it  does , and not so much what it  is . Unless, of course, what 
it is  is what it does; indeed, following this view about primitives, they are indi-
viduated by their functional role. This is the Functional View about the role and 
the nature of primitives that I will elaborate on and defend in what follows. But 
let me already anticipate one point, so you see where I am heading:  if two 
primitives do the same theoretical job, and  if they are individuated by their 
functional role, they are then equivalent not just for all theoretical purposes but 
metaphysically equivalent as well — they turn out to be just one and the same 
thing referred to in different ways. If that’s true, there’ll be consequences. 
 But there is another view about the nature of primitives — I will label it “the 
Content View” — that claims that not only primitives have a function but that 
they also have a content, a nature that is not functional. Under this view, if two 
primitives perform the same function, they may still not be the same thing, and 
thus they may not be metaphysically equivalent, but only theoretically equiva-
lent (that is, equivalent for all theoretical purposes). The slogan goes: even if 
they  do the same thing, they  are not the same thing. 
 Let me now take an example, to make these views about primitives clearer 
and to see what consequences they have. In another place  16  , I discussed in 
detail the case of the Bundle Theory and the Substratum theory, and I claimed 
that several versions (the interesting ones) of these views are equivalent. In the 
following section, I will take just one example, just one version of both the 
Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory, and only use it to illustrate the case 
I am trying to make about primitives. 
 §5. 
 On purpose, I will take here as my example an outcast: the Bundle Theory with 
(immanent) universals, that is typically rejected because of troubles arising 
from the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, and I will compare it to the 
Substratum Theory that is typically said not to suffer from any problems here. 
Take Max Black’s 17 possible world with nothing in it except two homogeneous 
spheres that are perfect qualitative duplicates of each other. Now, how can the 
Bundle Theory with universals account for numerical diversity of these two 
spheres? The thought is that since they are perfect qualitative duplicates, they 
are bundles of the very same universals, and so they turn out to be one and the 
same bundle, rather than two. In other words, The Bundle Theory is committed 
to endorse the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles which says that if two 
objects have all exactly the same properties they are identical — ’they’ are one 
object. Indeed, if the two objects are bundles of properties and if the properties 
are the same (numerically the same, since they are universals) then it seems 
unavoidable that the two bundles are numerically the same as well. But, as Max 
Black’s scenario shows, this principle is false, and so the Bundle Theory is false. 
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 There are various possible ways the Bundle Theorist can react to face such 
an objection, like for instance rejecting Black’s world as being a genuine pos-
sibility, or trying to account for numerical difference between the two spheres 
by appealing to haeccesitic properties (‘being identical to sphere S1’) or to 
location properties (‘being on the left of sphere S2’). But as we shall see, the 
Bundle Theorist does not need to appeal to such (mostly unpalatable) strategies, 
and she can actually get away from trouble in exactly the same way her opponent 
does. So let us fi rst ask, how does the Substratum Theory account for numerical 
diversity of the two spheres? The answer is: the Substratum Theory contains a 
useful primitive problem-solver to do that, namely, the substratum. Indeed, 
according to this view, material objects like apples, Ferraris, or spheres are 
made of two sorts of components: a substratum (a ‘bare particular’) and prop-
erties (universals, in our present case) had (or ‘instantiated’ or ‘supported’) 
by this substratum. What is a substratum? It’s the thing that supports/has/
instantiates properties of an object. This, clearly, is something the substratum 
 does . To put it in a more functional way, the role of the substratum in the theory 
is to be a function that takes properties ‘in’ and returns objects ‘out’.  That ’s 
what the substratum is doing, that’s,  inter alia , how and why it was introduced 
in the theory in the fi rst place, and that’s what it is (at least, under the Func-
tional View of such primitives. I’ll come back to the Content View below. 
Taking properties to make up objects is the substratum’s main theoretical role, 
it is thus a ‘unifying device’ — a primitive problem-solver that answers the 
question of the particularity of particulars. 
 Now, what about the two indiscernible spheres?  Prima facie , the Substratum 
Theory faces the same problem as the Bundle Theory: it uses universals, 
and since the two spheres have exactly the same properties, they instantiate 
the very same universals, and so they can neither be qualitatively distinguished 
nor numerically distinguished by their properties as it would be the case if these 
were tropes. But here again, the Substratum Theory can solve the problem with 
its powerful problem-solving primitive substratum: not only are substrata 
primitively responsible for the particularity of particulars, they are also respon-
sible for primitive numerical difference between them — indeed, it just is a 
primitive postulate of the Substratum Theory that two substrata are numeri-
cally different even if they are not qualitatively different (and the two spheres 
are then numerically different in virtue of the numerical difference between 
their substrata). Problem solved. With a problem-solver. 
 Let us now see how the Bundle Theorist can approach this matter. Bundle 
Theorists typically manifest their dislike for so-often-called ‘mysterious’ 
entities like substrata, and they build their objects only with properties tied 
together by a special polyadic property called ‘compresence’. Compresence, 
rather than a substratum, then plays the functional role of particularizing par-
ticulars: it is a relation that takes properties ‘in’ and returns objects ‘out’ and 
thus it plays with respect to this point the same role as the substratum; it is also 
a ‘unifying device’ whose primary (functional) role in the theory is to take 
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properties to make up objects. Now, relevantly to the problem with the two 
indiscernible spheres, it is worth noting that this primitive relation of compres-
ence does not contribute to the qualitative nature of objects and so it can very 
well be a numerically different relation in different objects without spoiling the 
two objects’ qualitative identity — and thus it can account for numerical diver-
sity of the two qualitatively identical spheres (the two spheres are then numer-
ically different in virtue of the numerical difference between the relations of 
compresence that tie together their properties; or perhaps better, in our present 
case, in virtue of the numerical difference between different  instances of com-
presence; either option can actually do the job). In this way, the relation of 
compresence is then not only a primitive problem-solver when it comes to the 
problem of particularity of particulars, but it can very well also primitively 
solve the problem with qualitatively indiscernible but numerically distinct 
objects — simply by postulating, exactly as the substratum theorist does with 
 her problem-solver — that this primitive unifying device is such that different 
objects are bundled together by qualitatively indistinguishable but primitively 
numerically distinct (instances of) relations of compresence. There is no 
reason why the Bundle Theorist should not be allowed to make such a move: 
she has, at her disposal, a primitive problem-solver, that she introduced in her 
theory because she needed to perform a theoretical job, and she can postulate 
it to possess any useful powers she needs it to, exactly as the substratum theo-
rist feels free to do. Both theories contain a primitive unifying device to make 
up objects, and if one of the parties claims hers to have the additional primitive 
capacity to be numerically distinct, albeit qualitatively identical in different 
objects, there is no reason why the other party could not do so as well, if she 
feels the need. If such a primitivist strategy is acceptable for one side of the 
debate, it then should be so for the other side. Problems solved. With problem-
solvers. (Note that I am not saying that building this additional power into 
her problem-solver is something that the Bundle Theorist  should do; all I am 
saying here is that she  can do it.) 
 §6. 
 Now, suppose that the Bundle Theorist follows this easy recipe. It then turns 
out that, fi rst, both the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory face their 
theoretical challenges in the same — primitive — way (at least, the two challenges 
I discussed above), since both views contain a problem-solving unifying device 
that allows them to account for particularity of particulars and for numerical 
difference between qualitatively indiscernible objects, and second, that since 
primitives are individuated by their functional role, and their role being in this 
case the same, they just turn out to be one and the same thing under different 
names. Indeed, what difference does it make to call a primitive problem-solver 
a “substratum” rather than “compresence” if, in the end, the job it does is the 
same regardless of what you call it? The difference only seems to be termino-
logical: stick to neutral vocabulary, like “unifying device”, and reformulate the 
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two views and see how they behave with respect to the problem of Identity 
of Indiscernibles. Both will be able to say that sphere S1 and sphere S2 can be 
distinguished by there being a primitively distinguished unifying device for S1 
and S2. This is how a claim of equivalence between the Bundle Theory and the 
Substratum theory can get off the ground. 
 In what I said above, I mostly presupposed the Functional View of primi-
tives, and I think that the case of the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory 
nicely illustrates how it works. If indeed this Functional View is correct, the 
primitives used by the two sides of the debate just turn out to be one and the 
same thing, and since, as we have already seen, primitives play a vital role 
in metaphysical theories (indeed, without its primitives, no theory would even 
begin to work, and primitives are used in all crucial places where a problem 
needs to be solved or a theoretical task needs to be done), it is then no wonder 
that if primitives of two theories turn out to be equivalent the theories that 
contain them turn out to be equivalent as well, and reveal themselves in the end 
to be no more than terminological variants. Thus, the combination of the Func-
tional View of primitives, the claim that primitives of two allegedly competing 
theories do the same job, and the claim that most of the theoretical job is done 
by primitives, encourages a strong conclusion of theoretical  and metaphysical 
equivalence between the two allegedly competing theories. 
 The Content View about the nature of primitives does not entail such a 
strong conclusion, but it entails one that, while weaker, is still pretty strong. 
According to the Content View, even if we grant that the two problem-solving 
unifying devices used by the two sides of the debate are functionally equiva-
lent, they still do have a different nature and thus they are not  metaphysically 
equivalent even if they are theoretically equivalent (that is, equivalent for all 
theoretical purposes). After all, the Content View says that compresence is a 
relation and a substratum is not, so they just are not the same thing no matter 
how similar their functions may be. As a consequence, the two theories that 
contain these problem-solvers are not metaphysically equivalent either, and 
only a weaker conclusion can be drawn: while the two sides of the debate are 
 not just terminological variants, it is epistemically under-determined which 
one we should prefer since they do the same job in very much the same way. 
 I believe that the Functional View is superior to the Content View. Think of 
the claim that one theory’s problem-solver is a relation and the other theory’s 
problem-solver is a substratum, and so they are entities with a different nature. 
What does such a claim amount to? Perhaps what one wants to say here is that 
there are some differences between the two problem-solvers like, for instance, 
the fact that a substratum is ‘ontologically independent’ (that is, it can exist 
without exemplifying any properties) while the relation of compresence cannot 
just ‘be there’ and relate nothing. But if that were the difference between the 
two problem-solvers, interestingly, it would be a  functional difference: it would 
be something the substratum can  do (‘standing alone’, tying no properties 
together) that compresence cannot  do . So, in such a case, the Functional View 
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applies: there is a difference between the two problem-solvers, and it is a func-
tional one. If this were true, of course, it would block any equivalence conclu-
sion between the two primitives (and consequently between the two theories) 
since it would show that the two problem-solvers actually do not do their jobs in 
the same way and do not play the same theoretical role. At best, any equivalence 
conclusion could thus only be partial. In another article  18  , I discussed this case 
about ‘independence’ with the result that there actually is no difference with 
respect to the two primitive problem-solvers at hand, but in principle it is an 
open possibility that there are places where they do turn out to play different 
roles. But let us leave this point aside: here, I am not defending any equiva-
lence claims, rather what I want to point out is that any such a way to show a 
difference between two primitives will be a functional difference (a difference 
in what one can  do that the other cannot  do )  — and so, I  am defending the 
Functional View of primitives. In principle, we should not be surprised to fi nd 
out that any difference between primitives is a functional one: primitives are 
introduced in a theory by the metaphysician who needs them to perform some 
important theoretical job because she cannot make her theory work otherwise, 
and so she’ll typically postulate her primitive as being ‘the thing that does this-
and-this job’ — and thus, defi ne it functionally. This is why I think that any 
difference between primitives will typically always be a functional one, since 
without the need for an important theoretical role to be played, there would be 
little reason to introduce such primitives in the fi rst place. If one wanted to 
insist that, in addition to the functions they play within a theory, primitives 
have a non-functional content (nature), this would amount then to insisting that 
there is  a difference that makes no difference — and it seems to me that there 
is little reason for doing anything like that when building our metaphysical 
theories. Such an attitude towards primitives would be having an unreasonable 
soft spot for the terminology one uses — words like “substance”, “substratum”, 
“relation”, and so on. 
 This completes my short discussion of some reasons a meta-metaphysician 
might have to argue for equivalence claims between theories. But here I am not 
so interested in these equivalences; rather I am interested in the nature of prim-
itive problem-solvers. When arguing for or against sexy claims of equivalence, 
one can be distracted from this question that is, I think, the more fundamental 
one — this is why I started this paper with a discussion of three clearly non-
equivalent views. What we have thus seen until now is that (i) primitives are 
problem-solvers, (ii) they are vital — no theory could even begin to work with-
out appealing to them, (iii) they do most, if not all, of the theoretical job done 
by our theories, (iv) they are ‘points of contact’ between theories, and (v) they 
are individuated by their functional role. 
 One might worry here whether the method I recommend using to see whether 
two theories are equivalent — that is, to look at how the theories and their prim-
itives  work , how they  function , to see whether any equivalence claim can 
be drawn — might give us equivalence too easily and too cheaply. Indeed, in a 
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very general way, one could use my claims to say that whenever two theories 
or two primitives explain the same thing, they turn out to be equivalent. The 
materialist and the dualist both account, in their own terms, for the fact that 
I feel back pain this morning and for the having of qualia in general. Does it 
then mean that I would say that they are equivalent, since they accomplish the 
same work in the end? Do their primitives “have the same function” because 
they somehow play the overall very general role of “helping the theory to solve 
the mind-body problem”? Doesn’t then my functional view of primitives make 
claims of theoretical equivalence between them, and consequently equivalence 
between theories that use them, too cheap? 
 In order to claim that two theories or two primitives are equivalent, not only 
must they do the same  overall job, but they must also do it  in the same way 
relevantly to an apt  level of analysis . Whether an equivalence claim is too 
cheap depends on the level of detail the claim provides. If such a claim is too 
general, it is very cheap; but if it is elaborated in detail and shows how the 
inner workings of two theories are similar and how their primitives behave in 
the same way at the same crucial places in the theories, it is worth the money. 
To take the example of my three theories from the beginning of this paper, one 
could thus say that since the trope theorist’s primitive problem-solver is one 
that works with tropes, while the resemblances nominalist’s does not, they do 
not work in the same way, since they “work with different tools”. True enough 
(and, again, I take these three views to be examples of  non -equivalent theories). 
But, on the other hand, one  can claim that these two problem-solvers accom-
plish the same function  with respect to the problem of providing an answer to 
the problem of attribute agreement — both do it in the  same way, since they do 
it in a  primitivist way. That is, they have the same overall function, relevant to 
a specifi ed problem. Problem-solvers are here to solve problems, and so it 
is appropriate to evaluate what they are and how they function relatively to a 
specifi ed problem. After all, this problem is the very reason for postulating 
them in the fi rst place. Now, if the problem is specifi ed by saying “we need to 
solve the attribute agreement problem” then the level at which the problem-
solvers that are involved in its solving should be evaluated and compared is 
somehow general. And, I submit, this is what actually happens in the case of 
the three theories that I take as my example. The problem of attribute agreement 
 is typically raised in a general way; indeed, if it were raised in a more precise 
way, like for instance “we need to solve the attribute agreement problem 
without having to accept any relations in our ontology” it would probably, 
and rightly, be seen as a question-begging and unfair way of putting the prob-
lem, by non-resemblance-nominalists. 
 What we learn here is that the answer to the question of whether two primi-
tives “do the same job in the same way” (that is, have the same function) is 
relative to a way of specifying the problem to be solved by these problem-
solvers. Similarly, the answer of whether two  theories are equivalent is also 
relative to a set of problems, puzzle cases, that we want them to provide a 
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treatment for (after all, that’s what theories are for). And as we have seen, it 
will not do to specify these problems in  too general way or in a  too detailed 
(question-begging) way. I think that there usually is a “best” or “preferred” 
or “non-question-begging” or “appropriate” way to put the problem to be 
solved, and it is part of the metaphysician’s job to identify what is the most apt/
relevant/best/appropriate level of analysis, and then to see how primitives (and 
theories) behave relative to it. Some levels are too general to be of any real use 
and some are too specifi c to the point they become question-begging; our job 
as metaphysicians is to determine what the correct/useful/best/appropriate 
level is. There is no general principled recipe for doing this; it is not a 
meta-metaphysical or purely methodological matter; rather it should be 
carefully done in detail when one does fi rst-level metaphysics and when 
one tries to make the best sense of a metaphysical problem and the theories 
that try to solve it. 
 §7. 
 Bearing the functional view of primitives in mind, and focusing on the fact (see 
(iii) above) that they do most, if not all, of the theoretical job done by our 
theories, one may start to ask itchy questions about the notion of ‘explanatory 
power’. From where does the explanatory power of our theories come? If what 
precedes is right, is all or almost all of their explanatory power just primitively 
postulated? What and how exactly do such theories explain? How can a 
primitive explain anything? After itchy questions, one may want to start to 
ask sceptical ones: What are such theories good for? Aren’t they just clever 
and elaborated ways of answering our questions by primitively postulated 
‘answers’? If so, what have we gained by building such theories? 
 I am not a sceptic, but I do feel itchy. Thus, in what follows I will discuss the 
notion of explanation and explanatory power, and try to answer some of these 
uncomfortable questions. A general picture about the nature of the metaphysical 
enterprise will then emerge. 
 §8. 
 Among the different types of explanations,  why-explanations hold an impor-
tant place: “Why did dinosaurs die out? Because a giant meteor collided with 
the Earth.” These explanations are often causal explanations. But this is not 
what we’re looking for here; the relation between a question like the problem 
of attribute-agreement, theories like the ones from the beginning of this paper, 
and their primitive problem-solvers are clearly not causal and the explanation 
involved is not a why-explanation in this sense. 
 Closer to home, here is a kind of explanation that it will be useful to consider 
in some detail; this is an example familiar from the literature about the mind-
body problem: “Why does lightning occur just when there is an electric dis-
charge between clouds or between clouds and the ground? Because lightning 
simply  is an electric discharge involving clouds and the ground. There is here 
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only one phenomenon, not two that are correlated with each other; and what 
we thought were distinct correlated phenomena turn out to be one and the 
same. Here the apparent correlation is understood as  identity .”  19  
 Thus, the relation between the explanadum and the explanans is here simply 
identity. Compare to our problem of attribute-agreement: the explanandum is 
the sharing of the same property, the explanans is, say, the instantiating of the 
same immanent universal. It does then seem like the right thing to say, if you 
are a friend of the universals view, that sharing the same property  just is instan-
tiating the same universal, comparably to the way lightning  just is atmospheric 
electric discharge. In the same way, if you are a friend of substrata, numerical 
diversity of spheres S1 and S2  just is or  consists in their having a numerically 
different substratum.  Prima facie , it seems then that the relation between a 
primitive problem-solver and the phenomenon it explains is identity. But there 
are some problems with this view. 
 First, it is not true that all identities are explanatory, as for instance Ruben  20  
argues. To take the example of lightning, the identity “lightning = lightning” is 
not explanatory, while the identity “lightning = atmospheric electric discharge” 
is, because even if there is only one phenomenon involved in the case of the 
latter identity, it is conceptualized in two different ways. This teaches us that 
explanation is — unlike identity — an irrefl exive relation. 
 Furthermore, one can offer reasons to think that even the identity “lightning = 
atmospheric electric discharge” is  not explanatory. This is the problem we had 
above: if the relation between ‘sharing the same property’ and ‘instantiating 
the same universal’ is identity, how does this  explain anything? This worry is 
also familiar from the discussion of the mind-body problem. Kim  21  , when dis-
cussing the psychoneural identity theory, says: “… Our conclusion, therefore, 
has to be that both forms of the explanatory argument are open to serious diffi -
culties. Their fundamental weakness lies in a problematic understanding of the 
role of identities in explanation, an important topic that has not received much 
attention in the literature. The only clear (and also simple) view is that identities 
function simply as rewrite rules in explanatory derivations — or any derivation, 
for that matter. […] We do not have to say that identities have no role to play 
 in explanations. For they can help  justify explanatory claims — he claim that we 
have explained something. […] It is only that identities do not generate expla-
nations on their own.” 
 The trouble, as I understand it, is that since the primitive problem-solver (the 
explanans) is actually the very same thing as the phenomenon we sought to 
understand (the explanandum), it is not very clear what we have gained by 
such an explanation; that is, by providing an explanation of what we wanted to 
understand in terms of a primitive that’s actually the same thing as what we 
yearned to have a better understanding of. 
 One can respond to these worries by arguing that the relation of explanation 
is a lot like identity but is not identity. It is irrefl exive, as we have already seen, 
but it is also asymmetrical. Granted, lightning  is atmospheric electric discharge, 
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and the phenomenon of sharing the same property  is the phenomenon of in-
stantiating the same universal. However, the explanation here does not consist 
just in pointing out this fact; it also points out that the explanans is  more 
fundamental than the explanandum. This is then what we gain. This is what we 
learn from a good explanation. Explanations of this type are such that one of 
the two sides of the explanation relation is more fundamental than the other 
(and thus, explanation is not only irrefl exive but also asymmetrical). What we 
have here then is a sort of  explanation-by-identity — but not  identity — that 
parallels a growingly familiar notion of grounding  22  : if  a is grounded in  b ,  a is 
nothing over and above  b .  a , in other words, is an “ontological free lunch” in 
Armstrong’s 23 sense; the “ontological price”, to use Schaffer’s term, you pay 
for  a and  b is just whatever you would pay for  b alone. Only in this sense can 
one talk about identity between  a and  b . 
 This kind of explanation goes around under many different names like ‘in 
virtue of’, ‘just is’, ‘is grounded in’, ‘is’, or ‘consists in’ — but these terms are 
tricky and are not always intended to mean anything like explanation. For 
instance, ‘consists in’ is sometimes taken to mean ‘constitutes’ that is a 
‘grounding’ relation familiar from the debate about material constitution  24  . 
We encounter this in very many cases of the workings of our metaphysical 
theories. For example, not only  a’s and  b ’s having the same property  is their 
instantiating the same universal (if you are a friend of universals) where the 
latter is taken to be more fundamental than the former, but we can also say that 
 a ’s persisting through time  is a ’s having temporal parts at different times 
(if you are a friend of temporal parts) where again the latter is taken to be a 
more fundamental phenomenon than the former. More often, one uses here the 
locution “in virtue of”:  a persists through time  in virtue of having temporal 
parts at different times. 
 In the case of lightning and an atmospheric electric discharge, the chain of 
explanation goes on until the most fundamental level is reached — and what the 
most fundamental level is depends here on the current state of physics; it is 
largely an empirical matter. Not so, of course, in the case of explanation rela-
tions between primitive problem-solvers and explananda of our metaphysical 
theories. As metaphysicians, we are most typically not ‘stopped’ by empirical 
matters, but rather we fi nd the end of our metaphysical discovery when we step 
on a concept that is unanalyzable any further without circularity — a substra-
tum, non-relational instantiation, resemblance, and so on, depending on your 
favourite theory. Such notions are then taken by our theories to be too funda-
mental to be usefully (in a non-circular way) further explained. This raises an 
interesting problem. 
 Explanatory power is one of the main criteria we use to evaluate our meta-
physical theories. After all, the very point of building a metaphysical theory in 
the fi rst place is to provide an explanation for some phenomena that we want 
to better understand (particularity of particulars, sharing the same property, 
persistence through time, …). If what I said above is correct, and very close to 
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what Schaffer  25  argues for in a different way, the picture one gets of what meta-
physics does and what it should do, thus, is not just to tell us  what there is but, 
more importantly, to tell us, as Schaffer puts it “what grounds what”, that is, in 
my way of putting it, to discover what are the most fundamental notions, which 
are primitive and which are not. The idea here, similar to Schaffer’s, is that 
metaphysics does not and should not give us a  list that is a sort of inventory of 
what there is, but rather a top-bottom structure of relations of ‘grounding’ or 
‘explanation’ between types of entities or between concepts, saying which are 
primitive, which are not, and which are more fundamental than others. 
 But now, the interesting problem arises from the fact that some such struc-
tures (some metaphysical theories) take as a primitive problem-solving explan-
ans what its opponent takes as being the explanandum, and  vice versa . Again, 
the case of our theories from the beginning of this paper provides us with a nice 
example. The theory that appeals to universals says that  a resembles  b because 
 a and  b both instantiate the numerically same universal.  a ’s resembling  b con-
sists in  a’s and  b ’s instantiating the same universal.  a and  b resemble each other 
in virtue of instantiating the same universal. And so on. The phenomenon of 
resemblance  is the phenomenon of instantiating the same universal, where the 
latter is more fundamental than the former. Identity (instantiating the numeri-
cally  same universal) is fundamental, resemblance is not — it is  derived from 
identity. But not so for the friend of Resemblance Nominalism: under her view, 
 a and  b have the same property because they are both members of the same 
resemblance class. Here,  resemblance is the fundamental notion, and identity 
(sameness of properties) is derived. 
 How to tell then which one of these structures is better? How to choose 
between such competing metaphysical theories? In some cases, as we have 
seen in §5-6, we do not have to make a choice: these are the cases where 
we discover that the allegedly competing sides of the debate are actually 
not very different from each other — that indeed they are theoretically and/
or metaphysically equivalent. But in many cases, this is not so, like the 
debate about persistence (endurantism vs. perdurantism  26  ), or the case of 
our three theories from the beginning of this paper concerning the problem 
of attribute agreement. Another way to ask the question is: how do we 
know that we are facing a primitive when we step on one? Is resemblance 
primitive? Is instantiation of a universal primitive? How to tell which one 
of these lies at the bottom of the structure and which one does not? As we 
have just seen in the preceding paragraph, one theory can take as a primi-
tive what the other takes as being higher in the hierarchy of its structure, 
and  vice versa , and it works — and, it actually works in quite a similar way 
in both cases, as we have seen in §2-3. Given that both friends of universals 
and friends of Resemblance Nominalism have the same right to introduce 
their own primitive problem-solving devices when they need one, it seems 
very hard to fi nd independent, objective, grounds to choose one structure 
over the other. 
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 I do not have a good answer to this question. I try to give one in a different 
article  27  , where I defend the view that the reasons to select one theory over its 
competitors are mainly grounded in aesthetic considerations, and in the evaluation 
of aesthetic properties metaphysical theories possess. But I do not wish to press this 
point here. What I would like to say here is that even if we do not have a nice and 
straightforward recipe to select the best structures, and to decide and choose what 
is more fundamental than what, and which are the best primitives, we learn here to 
acknowledge the importance of these ‘points of contact’ between our metaphysical 
theories, the importance of carefully thinking about the possibility of equiva-
lence between them, and thus to recognize the utmost importance of the role 
that primitives play in (the building of, and evaluations of) our theories. 
 Thus, we can answer these itchy questions: What is at stake in the competi-
tion between metaphysical theories? What is this competition good for? What 
do we learn? What is at stake is to fi nd out which is the best primitive, and what 
is more fundamental than what — what explains what. Sometimes the answer 
will be a bit frustrating (while nevertheless illuminating): these are the cases of 
theoretical and/or metaphysical equivalences between some allegedly competing 
views. Sometimes it may be argued that the answer is framework-relative, in a 
Carnapian way. And sometimes we will continue to fi ght tooth and nail to show 
that resemblance is a better primitive than instantiation. Such work is not an 
easy one, and it cannot be done in a paper or even in a book; rather it is the 
collective efforts of many metaphysicians that can bring any durable and good 
results. Such work, I suggest, is best seen as work on the primitives that sustain 
the structure of our metaphysical theories. 
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